CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

区域耕地生态价值补偿量化研究——以新疆为例

[目的]在耕地保护形势日趋严峻的情形下,开展耕地生态价值补偿量化研究对了解耕地外部性价值的大小及深化耕地生态价值的量化方法和思路具有重要意义。[方法]文章以新疆为例,从14个地州市的耕地生态服务价值出发,将生态超载指数作为耕地生态服务价值与生态足迹在各地州市转移的测度,同时综合考虑各地州市的经济发展状况,通过构建市域生态价值补偿量化模型分别测算各地州市耕地生态价值补偿量。[结果](1)2015年新疆耕地生态服务价值整体上有盈余输出,全疆共可获得生态补偿费103.31亿元;(2)2015年新疆南北疆耕地生态服务价值比为1:1.7,生态足迹总量比为1:2.2,生态超载指数北亏南盈,表明南北疆耕地生态足迹和耕地生态服务价值间呈"空间异位"格局;(3)新疆北疆乌鲁木齐市、克拉玛依市、吐鲁番市及哈密市共需支付耕地生态补偿费55.67亿元,北疆(乌鲁木齐市、克拉玛依市、吐鲁番市及哈密市外)和南疆地区分别可获得生态补偿费为96.59亿元和62.39亿元。[结论]该文可为新疆各地州市构建耕地生态价值补偿路径提供新思路,也可为以耕地生态价值量确定耕地保护指标和构建耕地生态补偿机制提供参考。     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Stock price crash risk and CEO power: Firm-level analysis

This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk.     

Real earnings management around CEO turnovers

Following CEO turnovers, US firms adjust real business activities to manage earnings downwards (REM bath). This effect is most pronounced in firms with low levels of institutional ownership. REM baths early in CEOs’ tenure can be confounded with legitimate adjustments to business activities. However, we show that they are not accompanied by increases in R&D or capital expenses, nor are they explained by restructuring expenses. CEOs with short tenure record more negative REM measures in their first year of tenure, when compared with CEOs with long tenure.     

股权再融资与企业现金分红

股权再融资往往意味着企业存在大量的融资需求,而实践中普遍存在的股权再融资后立即现金分红的现象有悖于募集资金的优序使用原则。基于此,本文从管理层自利视角出发,在对企业股权再融资后现金分红的行为偏好检验的基础上,进一步选取管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动作为管理层自利程度的代理变量,探索企业股权再融资后现金分红倾向的边界条件,为该行为背后的代理动机提供证明。基于2007~2017年所有A股上市公司样本,研究发现,企业的确存在股权再融资后立即现金分红的行为倾向;而较低的管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动会加剧企业股权融资对现金分红的促进作用。进一步研究发现,企业股权再融资活动会给现金分红带来消极的市场反应。上述研究结果表明,管理层自利是股权再融资的重要推动因素,而这一行为会给企业利益造成损害。     

我国牧区草原生态补偿机制构建研究

［目的］通过构建一套科学、合理的牧区草原生态补偿机制，解决牧区近10年来主要实施的一系列生态治理项目和措施中存在的草原生态补偿标准普遍偏低、政策缺少灵活性、监管体系不够完善、缺乏相应保障机制等问题。［方法］通过对国内有关草原生态补偿机制相关文献分类梳理，基于我国牧区草原生态环境现状，对比分析国内外实践，总结国外成功经验，定性分析补偿机制要素，对草原生态补偿机制进行全面、系统地分析论述。［结果］我国牧区草原生态补偿主体应以各级政府为主； 补偿对象应包括牧区牧民、草原生态环境保护的投资者和建设者以及牧区地方政府； 因保护草原生态环境而导致牧区和牧民的发展权受限由此产生的机会成本作为草原生态补偿标准； 补偿方式以中央财政纵向转移支付为主，以市场补偿为辅的组合模式。保障机制需完善法律法规、公众参与、监督管理、绩效评估等方面建设。［结论］我国牧区草原生态补偿机制的构建须对补偿责任主体、补偿范围、补偿标准、补偿方式及补偿保障机制等各要素要进行整体性、系统性深入分析，才能确保草原生态补偿机制能够满足牧区实际需求，提供有力保障。     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.